|
Page xxvii:-
add to these the names of many towns and villages, such as
Penrith, Penruddock, Caerdunnock. Glencoyn, Glenrudden, and
to these the curious compound name of Tor-pen-how.
So far I have thought it necessary to take notice of the
connection of the general dialect of these parts with other
tongues, either dead or living; further variations, which
may have happened to all dialects alike, have no connection
with the present subject. It would indeed be a curious
employment for history to take notice of the times when, and
the reasons why some terms have ceased in one mode of speech
whilst they remained in another: but they were beneath its
notice; besides, they probably ceased in a gradual manner;
and it generally takes notice of things which have either
suddenly started into notice, or have been suddenly
destroyed. I speak with respect to matters of this nature,
for great things will always demand attention.
There is another thing to which, though belonging to
language in general, I beg leave to advert: Words
frequently, in their various composition, and kindred
references, begin at last to forget their original import;
and that the more rapidly as any language is the more
unsettled; for there is a sort of poetry belonging to the
human mind which is very apt in discourse to substitute
resembling things for one another; or where the cause and
its effect are proportional, to use them indiscriminantly:
or again, in a still more distant analogy, to speak in
higher metaphors; and, by dint of habit and continual
acceptation, to forget that the phrases which we use are
merely emblematic;nor find it an easy matter; on account of
a familiarity with them, as the names of things of which
they are really but the type, to resolve them into their
original principles. Subtile men have taken advantage of
this prepossession, and have constructed curious theories
upon it. That my meaning may be more clearly understood, I
shall subjoin an example or two. We speak familiarly of a
mellow-sound, and a mellow-apple; that is of
two things, (the sound and the apple,) exceedingly
different; but because the effect they produce upon the
senses is somehow or other similar, we couple them with the
same epithet; and having given a name to the sensation
excited by the apple, we first apply it to the apple itself,
and then to the sound which excited a somewhat-similar
sensation; yet still we speak metaphorically, giving the
names of our own feelings to the things which excited them:
likewise, when the cause corresponds with its effect, we use
them indiscriminantly for each other, whether the Bishop of
Coyne will give us leave or not: thus, to contain impression
upon the senses from external objects, we give the name of
Weight and Heaviness, for the feeling or
effect is proportional to the cause or body that presses.
Again: When a similar sensation is excited by disease, we
give it the name of Weight, though there is no pressing body
in the case; thence, carrying it further still to that
feeling of mind which untoward circumstances produce, we
give the name of Heaviness and Sadness when no disease is
present, from its resembling the sensations excited by
disease; speaking still in metaphors, though unconscious of
it from habit, and always thinking that we express the thing
itself, whilst we only express its corresponding idea on our
own minds. I have inserted these general observations,
because they are particularly applicable to the dialects of
which I am speaking; for in them such a mode of speech is
remarkably frequent, and indeed constitutes the principal
part of discourse. Thus, (that I may select one or two of
the numberless instances that might be produced,) a calm
day is said to be lown, and a cool-designing man
has the same epithet bestowed on him: slape is
slippery, and therefore a person in whom one can
repose no confidence is a slape hand: that which is
smooth and soft is called Snod, and hance a many of an easy
calm deportment is a snod fellow. I forbear going
further, as it would lead me beyond my limits: and I shall
only observe, that such phrases, which abound in every
language, are like appeals from one sense to another for the
truth of the resemblance which is perceived.
Words also, by means of such metaphorical, and I think I may
call it arbitrary transpositions, sometimes entirely lose
their original one. The [greek] of the Greeks originally
signified only a being of more than human intelligence;
however, in the times
|